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In  response  to  perceived  failings  of  banks  in  meeting  the  credit  needs  of  the  communities  in 
which  they  operate,  Congress,  in  1977,  passed  the  Community  Reinvestment  Act  (CRA). 
Though  they  are  private  firms,  banks  have  always  been  subject  to  state  and/or  federal 
regulation  and  supervision  because  of  their  important  role  in  providing  depository  and  lending 
functions.  The  conventional  view  that  banks  take  the  funds  of  the  community,  safeguard  them, 
and  lend  them  back  to  the  community  provides  the  basis  for  the  observation  that  financial 
institutions  play  a vital  role  in  the  economic  development  of  any  community.  If  an  area  is 
denied  access  to  credit,  its  funds  (which  could  have  been  the  basis  for  economic  development) 
flow  out  of  that  area.  Hence,  there  are  concerns  about  “redlining’‘--where  banks  demarcate 
boundaries  between  areas  where  they  would  provide  loans  and  where  they  would  not--because 
it  contributes  to  uneven  development  among  communities. 
Furthermore,  an  economic  decline  in  a neighborhood,  perhaps  caused  by  factors  extraneous  to 
the  community,  may  lead  to  a reduction  in  its  creditworthiness,  as judged  by  lending  officers, 
and  in  turn  may  contribute  further  to  the  decline.  Government  action  in  this  area  is  entirely 
appropriate  because  of  the  increase  in  social  costs  of  a deteriorating  community.  This  is  made 
readily  apparent  by  empty  and  decaying  buildings  found  in  some  neighborhoods,  but  the  costs 
in  human  capital  losses  equally  enormous,  even  if  they  are  not  so  visible.  Empty  homes  and 
closed  businesses  mean  unemployment  with  concomitant  losses  to  the  individuals  and  to 
society.  The  purpose  of  the  CRA  was  to  halt  such  decline  and  ensure  that  credit  flows  would 
1 continue  in  communities  at  levels  adequate  to  prevent  cumulative,  negative  feedback  effects 
of  any  downward  spiral. 
To  evaluate  whether  banks  are  meeting  the  needs  of  their  communities,  the  CRA  established 
guidelines  used  by  examiners  for  assessment  (see  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination 
Council  {FFIEC}  1992,  and  Knodell  1992).  Included  in  the  assessment  factors  are:  types  of 
credit  services  available,  credit  application  practices,  geographic  distribution  of  credit 
extensions,  evidence  of  discrimination,  opening  and  closing  of  offices,  loan  origination,  and 
participation  in  federal  government  loan  programs.  Examiners  from  the  agencies  which 
regulate  the  banks  periodically  assess  compliance  with  the  CRA:  each  bank  must  provide 
information  to  the  examiners,  and  make  the  information  available  to  the  community  to 
facilitate  public  knowledge  of  its  community  reinvestment  practices. 
The  CRA  applies  to  all  federally  insured  commercial  banks,  savings  banks,  and  savings 
associations;  it  does  not  apply  to  bank  holding  companies,  correspondent  banks,  trust 
companies,  check  clearing  agencies,  and  credit  unions.  According  to  Knodell  (1992), 
compliance  with  the  CRA  is  evaluated  with  respect  to  two  broad  categories:  a)  is  the  bank 
engaged  in  sufficient  activity  to  “market”  its  services  in  its  defined  community;  and  b)  are  its 
services  actually  being  used  in  the  defined  community.  With  regard  to  the  first  category,  each 
bank  must  demonstrate  that  it  has  defined  its  market  area,  identified  the  financial  services 
required  in  the  market,  and  made  adequate  effort  in  providing  information  regarding  its 
services  to  all  segments  of  the  defined  community.  Specifically,  the  bank  must  show  that  it  is 
2 not  systematically  and unreasonably  excluding  any  segment  of  the community  in  its marketing 
activities.  The  second  category  evaluates  the contribution  the  bank  actually  makes  to the 
community:  this  involves  review  of loan  applications  and denials,  opening  and closing  of 
offices,  types  of  services  provided  at offices,  and participation  in community  development 
projects.  De facto  redlining  and discrimination  would  be identified  if there  were unreasonable 
disparities  in provision  of financial  services  across  geographic  areas  by race,  gender,  or ethnic 
composition.  The  primary  purpose  of the  CRA is to ensure  that  the management  of each 
covered  financial  institution  should  be actively  involved  in  formulating  a business  plan  so that 
the institution  will  market  its  services  to all  segments  of its community  (Knodell  1992). 
However,  there  are no  specific  guidelines  regarding  the level  of use of  its  services  that  must 
be attained  in its community--either  by the community  as a whole  or by  specific  groups 
within  the community. 
Each  financial  institution  subject  to compliance  is graded  during  the  CRA performance 
evaluation  (FFIEC  1992). This  evaluation  involves  the management  of  the institution,  the 
examination  agency  (that is, the regulatory  agency  responsible  for  the institution--either  the 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  {FDIC),  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  (OCC},  the 
Resolution  Trust  Corporation  (RTC),  or the Federal  Reserve  Bank  (FRB)),  and 
representatives  from  the  served  community.  The  institution  must provide  a CRA  statement  for 
the community  it serves,  with  a map of its designated  community,  a list  of the  types  of 
services  it will  provide,  and a notice  of the process  through  which  citizens  can  participate  in 
the CRA  process.  It must  also  maintain  a file  of public  comments,  and post  a notice  on  its 
3 premises  with  information  for  the  public  concerning  the  CRA  process.  The  examination 
agency  must  conduct  the  CRA  examination,  provide  a written  examination  report,  provide 
continued  CRA  supervisory  attention,  and  take  CRA  performance  into  account  when 
evaluating  applications  by  the  institution  to  obtain  federal  &posit  insurance,  to  open  new 
branches,  or  to  merge  with  other  institutions.  The  public  participates  in  the  process  by  making 
oral  and  written  comments  on  the  institution’s  performance.  The  CRA  performance 
examination  is  an  essential  component  of  the  CRA,  as  it provides  the  most  important  forum 
for  the  dialogue  among  the  institution,  the  regulating  agency,  and  the  public  served  by  the 
institution. 
Ninety  percent  of  the  evaluated  banks  receive  satisfactory  CRA  ratings:  indeed,  a  good 
number  of  them  receives  “outstanding”  CRA  compliance,  which  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
the  CRA  has  been  a  success.  However,  as  with  any  evaluation,  charges  have  been  made  that 
there  is  “grade  inflation”  in  the  CRA  reports.  If  this  is  in  fact  the  case,  then  a re-evaluation  of 
the  standards  applied  would  be  appropriate.  On  the  other  hand,  if  substantial  grade  inflation 
has  not  occurred,  and  if  in  fact  banks  are  meeting  the  credit  needs  of  their  communities  as 
they  are  defined,  then  any  perceived  credit  crunch  or  de  facto  discrimination  must  be  met  by 
a means  other  than  the  CRA.  If  the  credit  crunches  are  due  to  factors  beyond  the  control  of 
individual  banks,  then  a government  role  in  providing  the  credit  is  appropriate,  either  through 
monetary  policy  easing  or  through  provision  of  credit 
due  to  discrimination,  then  the  CRA  standards  should 
of  those  standards  is  required. 
by  other  means.  If  the  credit  crunch  is 
detect  it;  if  they  do  not,  then  a revision 
4 However,  there  is good  evidence  that the  CRA  alone  will  not  eliminate  de facto 
discrimination  in  access  to credit.  For example,  in a study  conducted  by  the FRB  of  Boston,  it 
was revealed  that  there  was no  significant  difference  in lending  practices  of  banks  with  CRA 
obligations  to minorities  in  studied  neighborhoods  versus  minorities  in  neighborhoods  with  no 
CRA  obligations  (Bradbury,  Case,  and Dunham  1989). Even  banks  with  CRA  obligations  in 
minority  neighborhoods  make  significantly  fewer  loans  in  black  communities  than  in  white 
communities.  Furthermore,  a study  by  Communities  for  Accountable  Reinvestment  found  that 
during  a fourteen  month  period  in  1987-88, Bar&America  made  only  one  of the  1323 single- 
family  home  loans  in  South  Central  Los  Angeles,  while  Security  Pacific  made  only  three, 
even  though  both  banks  won  high  marks  for  CRA compliance.  However,  looking  at only  one 
type  of lending  does  not necessarily  provide  an accurate  assessment  of  a bank’s  total  lending 
in  a community. 
Some  banks  respond  that  the  CRA  imposes  a burden  and additional  costs  on  their  operations, 
and  thus  in  itself  contributes  to the credit  crunch.  Any  re-evaluation  of  the  CRA  standards, 
then,  must  also  consider  the costs  to the  individual  banks.  The  appropriate  guide  to policy  is 
the  balancing  of  the  social  and private  costs  and benefits  of  lending  activities.  The  goal  is  a 
policy  that  brings  government’s  intervention  in line  with  the costs  to society  of  the market 
failure  in  lending,  while  at the  same time,  assuring  that  bank  profitability  is not  unduly 
injured.  If the  CRA  cannot  be revised  in  such  a way  as to  meet  the  financial  services  needs  of 
underserved  communities  without  imposing  excessive  costs  on  conventional  banks,  then  the 
government  must  look  to an alternative. 
5 II. Community  Development  Bank  Proposals  and  the CRA 
President  Clinton  has  called  for  the  creation  of  one  hundred  community  development  banks  to 
revitalize  distressed  communities.  In  response,  and  as  part  of  our  ongoing  research  into 
financial  system  restructuring  at  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute,  we  have  developed  a 
proposal  for  the  establishment  of  a nationwide  system  of  community  development  banks 
(CDBs).  This  proposal  was  outlined  in  our  Public  Policy Brief  no.  3,  “Community 
Development  Banking,  A  Proposal  to  Establish  a Nationwide  System  of  Community 
Development  Banks”,  (January  1993). 
Unlike  our  own,  some  proposals  for  establishing  CDBs  allow  any  depository  institution  that 
invests  in  the  equity  of  a community  development  bank  to  be  exempt  from  CBA  compliance. 
One,  for  example,  proposes  that  the  investing  bank  be  permitted  to  invest  up  to  five  percent 
of  its  equity  in  the  community  development  bank,  and  that  any  institution  that  meets  this 
maximum  investment  would  receive  a CRA  rating  equal  to  that  of  the  community 
development  bank  in  which  it  has  invested.  This  means  that  for  an  investment  equal  to  as 
little  as  one-quarter  of  one  percent  of  its  assets  (5%  of  equity,  with  its  equity  equal  to  5%  of 
its  assets),  the  institution  would  avoid  the  CRA  process  entirely.  Furthermore,  the 
“community”  of  the  community  development  bank,  as  it  is  defined  for  compliance  with  the 
CBA,  would  include  the  combined  market  or  service  areas  of&l  the  investing  depository 
institutions.  This  means  that  the  investment  of  any  particular  depository  institution  in  a 
community  development  bank  would  be  highly  diluted  with  respect  to  its  own  community,  for 
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community  served  by  any  particular  depository  institution. 
We  believe  there  are a number  of problems  with  the  alternative  proposals  that  would  weaken 
the  CRA.  First,  the vast  majority  of  commercial  banks  are already  complying  with  the 
requirements  of  the  CRA;  we believe  that  these  requirements  should  be retained  and,  indeed, 
strengthened,  because  they  provide  an opportunity  for  a dialogue  to take  place  between  each 
commercial  bank  and  the public  it is designed  to serve.  Second,  in  spite  of  compliance  with 
the  CRA,  there  is  substantial  evidence  that  de facto  discrimination  in  lending  exists:  certain 
well-identified  segments  of  society  are systematically  denied  credit.  This  indicates  that  the 
CRA  and  anti-discrimination  rules  alone  cannot  provide  sufficient  access  to credit  for  all 
segments  of  the community.  Third,  the existing  financial  system  does  not  provide  a sufficient 
level  of  transactions,  payment,  and  savings  services  to certain  segments  of  the population: 
furthermore,  recent  trends  (which  can  be expected  to continue)  have  caused  traditional  banks 
to reduce  the  supply  of  these  services  to those  communities  that  were  never  well-served.  For 
these  reasons,  we advocate  the development  of  a system  of  CDBs  designed  to  supplement  the 
CRA  in order  to provide  needed  financial  services  to targeted  communities. 
We believe  that  while  investment  in  a community  development  bank  should  be considered 
during  the CRA  evaluation  for  a depository  institution,  the institution  should  not  be exempted 
from  the process  since  this  is not  consistent  with  the  spirit  of  CRA.  As discussed  above,  the 
CRA  evaluation  process  is the primary  context  in which  a dialogue  between  the  institution 
7 and  its  community  takes  place.  For  reasons  to  be  discussed  below,  this  can  play  an  important 
role  in  helping  to  change  the  banking  community’s  expectations  regarding  under-served 
neighborhoods.  Community  development  banks  will  further  this  process  by  proving  that  some 
underserved  areas  do,  in  fact,  have  projects  that  can  be  profitably  financed.  Further,  allowing 
a commercial  bank  to  avoid  the  CRA  process  merely  by  investing  in  a community 
development  bank  (that  may  have  a much  wider  service  area  than  the  commercial  bank) 
dilutes  this  process  of  dialogue  between  the  bank  and  the  community  it  serves.  Instead,  the 
commercial  bank’s  community  should  be  defined  as  that  which  it  serves  directly,  and  not  as 
that  served  by  all  institutions  which  have  invested  in  a particular  community  development 
bank.  Finally,  the  limited  and  often  minuscule  investment  in  a community  development  bank 
envisioned  in  some  proposals  (as  low  as  one-quarter  of  one  percent  of  assets)  cannot 
substitute  for  the  CRA  evaluation  process,  which  determines  the  extent  to  which  the 
institution  has  “reinvested”  in  its  community. 
Senator  Bradley’s  proposal,  titled  the  “Community  Capital  Partnership  Act  of  1993,  is  much 
more  similar  in  spirit  to  ours.  This  act  would  provide  Federal  assistance  to  community 
development  financial  institutions  in  the  form  of  operating  assistance  or  capital  assistance  to 
community  lenders  that  wish  to  expand  activities  into  areas  identified  as  consistent  with  the 
CDB  model.  This  model  is  based  on  non-profit  lenders  in -target  areas  that  routinely  make 
small  loans  or  equity  investments.  While  our  model  deviates  in  several  respects  from  this 
proposal,  neither  would  weaken  the  CRA. 
8 Before  examining  how  a  system  of  CDBs  can  supplement  the  CRA,  we  analyze  evidence  of 
discrimination  and  redlining  in  lending  and  in  other  financial  services  that  must  be  provided 
by  a financial  system.  We  argue  that  neither  free  market  forces  nor  the  CRA  alone  can  ensure 
that  a  sufficient  supply  of  financial  services  reaches  every  community. 
III. Lending  Discrimination  and  Redlining 
Discrimination  and  redlining  are  pervasive  phenomena,  particularly  in  the  home  mortgage 
market.  Profit  seeking  behavior  of  private  financial  institutions  does  not  eliminate  either 
problem.  A  brief  analysis  of  each  problem  will  help  us  to  understand  why  this  is  the  case.  We 
begin  with  the  process  through  which  loans  are  solicited  and  evaluated. 
A.  Loan  solicitation  and  application  processes 
By  soliciting  customers,  a financial  institution  plays  an  important  role  in  the  initiation  of 
loans.  It  must  define  its  market  area  and  identify  potential  customers;  it  must  then  provide 
information  to  potential  customers.  In  turn,  customers  are  generated  in  the  mortgage  market 
only  after  the  sale  of  real  estate  has  been  initiated.  Consequently,  any  processes  that 
systematically  deny  equal  access  to  real  estate  will  automatically  bias  mortgage  markets.  If 
sellers  or  their  agents  discriminate  by  race,  gender,  or  other  characteristic,  then  banks  will  not 
be  able  to  solicit  mortgage  business  from  those  so  excluded:  if  real  estate  developers 
systematically  avoid  new  projects  or  restoration  in  certain  neighborhoods,  banks  will  not  be 
9 able  to solicit  mortgage  business  in these  areas.  Such discrimination  is beyond  the control  of 
financial  institutions.  Even  if this  sort of discrimination  does  not  occur,  selective  solicitation 
by  banks  can  lead  to exclusion  of  some  from  the mortgage  business. 
Once  customers  have  been  solicited,  there  are at least  five  important  factors  that  contribute  to 
a successful  loan  application  process.  First,  the process  is designed  to uncover  borrower 
characteristics:  credit  history,  income,  outgo,  net worth,  and collateral.  Given  this  information, 
banks  will  try to estimate  the ability  of the customer  to  service  the  loan.  Second,  the process 
must consider  the  loan  characteristics:  principal  amount,  the interest  rate,  and  the  use of  the 
loan.  Third,  the  bank  must  consider  cyclical  characteristics  of the economy  (including  both 
regional  and  national  cycles).  Fourth,  it must estimate  the prospective  income  flows  of each 
class  of  borrowers  on  the basis  of longer  trend  characteristics  of  the economy  (both  regional 
and  national).  Fifth,  the  loan  officer  must  apply  various  rules  of  thumb  (some  formal,  others 
informal)  in evaluating  the borrower  in  terms  of the  ability  to pay:  this  is based  on  borrower 
characteristics,  expected  income  flows,  the interest  rate,  and maximum  loan  amount  among 
other  factors.  Provision  of credit  is not  like  the  sale of  a commodity;  it is a very  complex 
process  that  usually  involves  substantial  face-to-face  interaction. 
B. Loan  Acceptance  or  Rejection 
The  application  process  ends  when  the bank  accepts  or rejects  the  loan  application.  Rejection 
can  occur  for  a variety  of reasons:  the borrower’s  income  flows,  debt  burden,  collateral, 
10 wealth,  credit  history,  or  “character”  may  be  nonconforming  either  with  respect  to  the  bank’s 
standards,  or  with  regard  to  underwriting  standards  adopted  in  secondary  markets. 
Alternatively,  the  characteristics  of  the  m  may  not  meet  rules  of  thumb  established  by  the 
bank,  by  supervising  agencies,  or  by  secondary  markets:  the  size  of  the  loan  request  may  have 
been  too  small  (given  loan  initiation  and  servicing  costs,  there  is  a minimum  size  of  loan  each 
bank  can  profitably  provide  at  a competitive  interest  rate),  or  too  large  (each  bank  has  formal 
and  informal  rules  regarding  size  of  any  single  loan--usually  equal  to  a fraction  of  the  bank’s 
net  worth).  The  loan  may  be  also  nonconforming  with  respect  to  underwriting  standards  of 
secondary  markets  in  a number  of  ways  (e.g.,  a mortgage  on  housing  that  does  not  meet  FHA 
standards).  Furthermore,  the  loan  may  be  prohibited  by  supervisory  agencies  for  a number  of 
reasons,  or  the  proposed  use  of  the  loan  may  conflict  with  regulatory  practice.  Finally,  the 
application  may  be  rejected  due  to  discrimination  by  the  loan  officer  or  by  other  bank 
officers,  or  due  to  the  practice  of  “redlining”. 
In  essence,  the  complexity  of  the  loan  process  provides  many  points  at  which  those  who 
probably  could  successfully  service  a loan  at  an  interest  rate  that  would  be  profitable  to  the 
bank  will  not  receive  credit.  As  stated  earlier,  discrimination  and  redlining  only  exacerbate  the 
problem. 
1) Discrimination:  financial  institutions  are  prohibited  from  engaging  in  discriminatory 
activity  by  the  Equal  Credit  Opportunity  Act  and  the  Fair  Housing  Act:  the  Home  Mortgage 
Disclosure  Act  mandates  disclosure  of  data  that  help  to  determine  whether  financial 
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h  discrimination,  there  is substantial  evidence  of de facto  discrimination  by race  [it must  be 
emphasized,  however,  the data  are not,  and probably  cannot  be, conclusive].  Furthermore,  it is 
not  necessarily  illegal  to discriminate  on  the basis of  income  or wealth;  indeed,  these  factors 
are explicitly  used to determine  credit-worthiness.  Although  these  issues  are very  complex,  we 
believe  a convincing  case  can  be made  that  certain  segments  of the  community,  particularly 
low-income,  low-wealth  minorities,  are systematically  denied  equal  access  to credit. 
Discrimination  concerns  characteristics  of  the borrower  that  are unrelated  to loan  default  rates, 
but which  affect  the probability  of  a loan  being  made.  Typically,  evidence  of  discrimination  is 
found  by looking  at micro  data  to see whether,  after controlling  for  all  variables  that  should 
matter,  some  other  variable  that  should  not matter  (e.g., race  or sex)  still  plays  a role  in 
explaining  the  likelihood  of  loan  acceptance.  It must  be recognized,  however,  that  loan 
applications  may  be skewed  by discrimination,  for  the bank’s  solicitation  process  may  be 
discriminatory  if it chooses  not  to market  loans  to certain  segments  of the  population  based 
on  these  characteristics. 
It could  be argued  that  minorities  receive  less credit  only  because  they  are less credit  worthy, 
since  their  income  and  wealth  tend  to be lower.  The degree  of  access  to credit  has  a direct 
impact  on  the credit-worthiness  of a borrower  over  a lifetime.  The  volume  of liabilities  one 
may  issue,  as well  as the  terms  on which  they  are issued,  will  affect  almost  every  important 
factor  that  will  determine  an individual’s  economic  success--from  the quantity  and quality  of 
12 education  and  training  one  may  receive,  to the type  of productive  activity  the  individual  will 
pursue  as a career.  In  other  words,  adequate  access  to credit  at reasonable  terms  is 
essential  for many  activities  that will,  to a great  extent,  determine  an individual’s  success 
at servicing  debt.  If a segment  of  society  faces  discriminatory  treatment  in  this  regard,  it &l 
be less  credit-worthy  (Isenberg  and Dymski  1992). 
Finally,  loan  officers  and  bank  owners  have  a narrow  view  of their  market.  The  types  of 
activity  that  can  be profitably  financed  cannot  be known.  As John  Maynard  Keynes  said,  it is 
sometimes  better  to follow  the  leader  and to be conventionally  wrong  than  it is to be 
unconventionally  correct.  Banks  and bankers  have  a preferred  habitat:  this  does  not  mean  that 
the  habitat  cannot  change,  but that  it may  change  only  slowly.  If  some  segments  are viewed 
as excessively  risky,  they  will  be denied  credit,  thus leading  to lower  credit  worthiness.  It 
may  be very  difficult  to change  the perception  of  bankers  about  some  segments  of  the 
community,  but credit-worthiness  cannot  be increased  until  the  supply  of credit  rises. 
Some  would  argue  that  such  discriminatory  behavior  is irrational,  and  as such,  it will  be 
eliminated  by  market  forces.  Even  if it were  true that market  forces  would  eventually 
eliminate  discrimination,  the evidence  is overwhelming  that  prejudicial  attitudes  are 
exceedingly  long-lived:  this  is because  they  are maintained  by  many  other  societal  forces. 
Loan  officers  and other  bank  employees  (and owners)  cannot  live  separately  from  their 
cultural  environment. 
13 Others  argue  that  the  recent  trend  toward  securitization  (particularly  of  home  mortgages)  will 
equalize  access  to  credit.  Since  the  initiating  bank  is  not  going  to  hold  the  securitized  loan,  it 
should  not  care  whether  the  borrower  is  a white  male.  However,  this  still  ignores  the  fact  that 
loan  solicitation  and  application  processes  provide  ample  opportunity  for  discrimination.  Even 
in  the  case  of  securitized  and  government-guaranteed  mortgages,  the  application  process  often 
includes  the  face-to-face  interview,  Indeed,  securitization  could  actually  decrease  the  supply 
of  credit  to  some  groups  if  secondary  market  underwriting  criteria  bias  the  process  against 
some  groups  (see  Isenberg  and  Dymski  1992,  and  Dymski  1993,  for  an  analysis  of  secondary 
market  bias  against  low  income  and  minority  groups). 
2)  Redlining:  unlike  discrimination,  which  has  to  do  with  the  borrower’s  characteristics, 
redlining  has  to  do  with  the  characteristics  of  the  neighborhood.  A  bank  that  engages  in 
redlining  demarcates  an  area  in  which  it  will  not  normally  lend.  This  need  not  be  irrational: 
some  neighborhoods  will  have  much  higher  default  rates  than  others  because  of  “spillovers”, 
or  “externalities”--  two  identical  individuals  might  experience  very  different  default  rates 
merely  because  they  live  in  different  neighborhoods.  The  redlined  neighborhoods  will  be 
avoided  in  loan  solicitation  (thus,  fewer  applications  will  be  received),  and  applicants  from 
these  neighborhoods  will  face  systematically  higher  rates  of  rejection.  In  redlining,  the  face- 
to-face  nature  of  the  application  does  not  play  a major  role  in  denial;  only  the  characteristics 
of  the  neighborhood  matter.  Redlining  will  not  be  eliminated  by  “free  markets,”  since  pure 
redlining  is  often  regarded  as  a good  business  practice.  The  appropriate  test  for  pure  redlining 
is  to  see  whether  loan  solicitation  is  reduced  and  loan  rejection  is  higher  in  specific 
neighborhoods. 
14 In practice,  however,  racial  discrimination  is often  involved  in redlining.  If race  is associated 
with  neighborhoods  with  undesirable  characteristics,  it can  be used  as indicator  of  these 
unwanted  characteristics.  In essence,  if minorities  tend  to live  in neighborhoods  with  socio- 
economic  factors  that  lead  to problem  loans,  race  alone  can  be used to identify  communities 
to be redlined  Loans  are then  not  solicited  from  minority  neighborhoods,  or they  are denied 
more  frequently  in  these  neighborhoods.  The  appropriate  test for  such  “racial  redlining”  is the 
race  of  the neighborhood  (that  is, identifying  neighborhoods  by percent  minority)  rather  than 
the race  of the  applicant.  Racial  redlining  will  likely  be interpreted  as illegal  discrimination, 
whereas  pure redlining  is not necessarily  illegal--so  long  as the case  can  be made  that  the 
likelihood  of a problem  loan  is higher  for  each  rejected  applicant. 
Because  access  to credit  is so important  to economic  success  of  individuals,  it will  also  be 
important  to the economic  success  of a neighborhood.  If credit  is systematically  denied  to a 
neighborhood,  that  community  will  almost  certainly  suffer  economic  decline.  Redlining  affects 
to the  greatest  extent  the value  of geographically  fixed  assets  (particularly  homes  and  small 
businesses)  where  spillovers  can  be large  (Dymski  1993). For  these  assets,  the  value  is not 
determined  only  (or even  primarily)  by its own  condition,  but also  by that  of  the perceived 
condition  of the  surrounding  environment.  Obviously,  the  value  of  a home  will  be determined 
substantially  by its  neighborhood.  Rehabilitation  of one  home  in a neighborhood  will  have 
significant  spillover  effects  on  others:  if all  the homes  in the  neighborhood  were  to receive 
rehabilitation  loans,  each  homeowner  could  capture  the  spillover  effects--but  if only  one 
owner  rehabilitates,  he/she  cannot  recapture  the  spillovers.  This  is analogous  to the  activities 
15 of  the lending  banks:  only  if others  will  lend  to a neighborhood  can  spillovers  be captured, 
but no  bank  wants  to be the  sole  lender.  The process  also  works  in reverse:  if  some  banks 
withdraw  from  a neighborhood,  “market  forces”  will  lead  to further  withdrawals. 
Since  the  net worth  of  a home  (or business)  is a primary  determinant  of access  to credit, 
those  homeowners  and business  people  who  find  their  geographically  fixed  assets  are in  the 
“wrong”  neighborhood  will  also  fiid  their  access  to credit  is cut-off  as their  net  worth  falls 
(Dymski  1993). “Free markets,”  therefore,  will  punish  such  neighborhoods:  no  individual  bank 
can  lend  in  the  neighborhood  unless  others  are willing  to do  so because  the  “externalities” 
created  by redlining  will  increase  the  likelihood  of loan  problems  faced  by  the  lender  that 
does  not redline. 
There  is evidence  of  discrimination  and of redlining.  In  October  1991, data  from  the Home 
Mortgage  Disclosure  Act  (HMDA)  indicated  that  minorities  receive  loans  at a rate  far lower 
than  comparable  whites.  As an example,  according  to national  data,  blacks  are turned  down 
two  and one-half  times  more  frequently  than  whites.  According  to a study  by  the FRB of 
Boston,  even  after  taking  account  of economic  and other  nonracial  factors  (income,  wealth, 
lower  value  of housing),  housing  and mortgage  credit  markets  function  in  a way  that  hurts 
black  neighborhoods  in  Boston  (Bradbury,  Case,  and Dunham  1989). Indeed,  the  authors 
found  that  the ratio  of mortgage  loans  to housing  varies  systematically  by race:  black 
neighborhoods  receive  24%  fewer  mortgages,  even  after  controlling  for  a variety  of  nonracial 
variables.  Minority  applicants  were  60% more  likely  than  whites  to be rejected  for  mortgages, 
even  after  controlling  for  the  nonracial  variables. 
16 Part of  the reason  for racial  differences  in mortgages  may  be attributed  to the rise  of the 
secondary  market  in mortgage  loans,  which  requires  that  mortgages  conform  to underwriting 
criteria  so they  may  be sold  in the  secondary  markets.  Between  1977-81, only  3% of new 
loans  were  securitized,  but between  1986-89, nearly  44% were  securitized  (Isenberg  and 
Dymski  1992). Most  securitized  mortgages  are guaranteed  by  federal  government  agencies 
(Fannie  Mae, Freddie  Mac,  or Ginnie  Mae).  In  a General  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  study  of 
government-insured  mortgage  loans,  it was found  that  87% of  the loans  went  to white  areas, 
and  83% to areas  where  incomes  averaged  more  than  $35,000.  The  GAO  found  the  number  of 
mortgage  loans  bought  by Fannie  Mae  and Freddie  Mac per homeowner  declines  as the 
percent  of  minorities  in  a neighborhood  rises.  A study  of banks  in fourteen  cities  found 
in minority  neighborhoods,  four  cents  per dollar  of deposits  is loaned  for  mortgages  in 
minority  neighborhoods,  versus  eight  cents  per deposit  dollar  in white  neighborhoods. 
that 
These  results  are at least  in part  attributable  to the underwriting  criteria  that  eliminate  low- 
income,  low-wealth  households  (Isenberg  and Dymski  1992). Furthermore,  guidelines  adopted 
by Fannie  Mae  (which  holds  or insures  22% of  outstanding  conventional  single-family  home 
mortgages)  essentially  require  it to favor  good  neighborhoods  with  rising  economic  trends, 
and prohibit  it from  lending  95% of the  value  of  homes  in  areas  with  declining  markets.  If 
minorities  disproportionately  live  in declining  neighborhoods,  secondary  market  underwriting 
criteria  will  systematically  deny  credit  to them. 
Bankers  respond  that  the HMDA  data  do not tell  the whole  story  because  other  factors  are 
17 involved,  which  do not  necessarily  indicate  discrimination  by  bankers.  Low  incomes  mean 
low  net  wealth  and,  therefore,  it is not  surprising  that  low  income  households  find  it difficult 
to obtain  loans.  Many  in the  banking  community,  and its political  supporters,  have  argued  for 
elimination  of the  CRA  because  it is seen as burdensome,  costly,  or unnecessary:  they  argue 
that  bankers  are  already  making  all the  loans  that can  be profitably  made--those  that  are  not 
made  would  have  high  default  rates  because  the income  and  wealth  of  applicants  are too  low. 
Interestingly,  however,  industry  statistics  reveal  that  default  rates  are positively  correlated 
with  income,  and  default  rates  are systematically  higher  on  mortgage  loans  of  $140,000  or 
more  than  on  loans  of lesser  amounts  (Isenberg  and Dymski  1992). Of course,  there  is no 
way  to obtain  default  rates  for  those  who  have  been denied  mortgages  due  to  low  income  or 
wealth:  however,  limited  experience  by existing  community  bankers  seems  to indicate  that 
there  are  segments  of  the community  that  cannot  obtain  conventional  loans,  but that  do  not 
exhibit  abnormal  rates  of default  on mortgage  and rehabilitation  loans  from  community  banks. 
For  example,  Shorebank  Corporation  of Chicago,  a holding  company  that  includes  a bank,  a 
real  estate  development  corporation,  a small  venture  capital  firm,  and  the  Neighborhood 
Institute  (which  offers  low  income  housing  development,  remedial  education,  and  training), 
experienced  a loan  loss  ratio  of  0.46%  in  1990 and 0.67%  in  1991--certainly  not  excessive 
when  compared  to the  industry  average.  Shorebank  has provided  the finance  for rehabilitation 
of  8,000  apartments,  and only  1.82% of the  loans  on these  are nonperforming  (versus  an 
industry  average  of  3.41%).  During  the first  nine  months  of  1992, Shorebank’s  annualized 
earnings  were 98 cents  per $100  of  assets  (while  the industry  average  was 96 cents). 
18 If  minorities  do  not  receive  loans  because  of  discrimination,  laws  should  be  strengthened  to 
end  such  practices.  However,  if  they  do  not  receive  loans  because  of  factors,  such  as  the 
existence  of  spillovers  that  are  beyond  the  control  of  individual  banks  or  of  borrowers,  then 
the  government  must  play  a role  in  assuring  that  adequate  credit  is  available. 
We  believe  that  three  factors  have  significantly  hindered  the  ability  of  low-income,  low- 
wealth,  and  frequently  minority  residents  of  certain  communities  to  obtain  household  and 
business  credit:  increased  securitization  of  loans,  falling  numbers  of  bank  branch  offices 
(particularly  in  low-income  neighborhoods),  and  lack  of  familiarity  of  traditional  bankers  with 
those  communities  that  are  underserved. 
First,  as  discussed  above,  the  increasing  use  of  underwriting  criteria  in  generating  conforming 
home  mortgage  loans  has  tended  to  exclude  identifiable  segments  of  society.  We  believe  that 
within  these  excluded  segments,  there  remain  a  significant  number  of  households  whose 
demand  for  mortgage  and  rehabilitation  loans  could  be  met  without  entailing  excessive 
lender’s  risk.  As  evidence,  we  point  to  the  (admittedly  limited,  thus  far)  success  of  the 
community  development  banks  already  in  existence.  If  the  term  is  used  narrowly,  there  are 
only  four  successful  community  development  banks;  if  the  term  is  used  broadly,  there  are  as 
many  as  several  hundred.  These  have  been  able  to  find  a profitable  niche  in  providing  limited 
services  to  low-income/low-wealth  communities. 
Second,  due  to  bank  and  thrift  failures,  closures,  and  mergers,  the  number  of  small, 
19 independent  financial  institutions  operating  in the US has declined  substantially,  particularly 
in  low-income  urban  areas,  and this  trend  can  be expected  to continue.  In  a study  of  five 
cities,  Caskey  (1992)  found  that  communities  with  a majority  of black  and/or  Hispanic 
residents  are  substantially  less  likely  to have  a local  bank:  indeed,  the mean  number  of  banks 
(including  branches)  per census  tract  with  a majority  of blacks  and/or  Hispanics  is less  than 
half  that  of  “nonminority”  tracts.  Furthermore,  Caskey  found  some evidence  that recent  bank 
closures  have  disproportionately  affected  low  income  and minority  communities,  and  similar 
results  for  other  cities  were found  by Leichter  (1989). 
Every  financial  institution  has  a “preferred  habitat”--a  geographically  and  functionally  defined 
area within  which  it operates.  Furthermore,  the  type  and  size of  services  that  will  be provided 
are a function  of  the  size of  the financial  institution.  For example,  banks  have  traditionally 
used  “rules of  thumb”  (often  also  adopted  by regulatory  agencies)  that  link  the  maximum  size 
of  loan  made  to the  size of the  bank’s  equity;  a ratio  of  5-10%  is common.  This  means  that  a 
bank  with  $500  million  in equity  can  make  loans  as large  as $50 million,  while  a bank  with 
$500,000  of  equity  can  make  loans  as large  as $50,000.  The  rapid  decline  of  small, 
independent  financial  institutions  has reduced  the number  of  “small  deals”  that  are likely  to be 
made. 
Third,  bankers  proceed  for  the most  part on  the basis  of what  has been  successful  in the past, 
and they  operate  to a great extent  on  the basis  of informal  (and sometimes  formal)  rules  of 
thumb.  They  are  (and  should  be) wary  of unfamiliar  activities,  neighborhoods,  and 
20 characteristics  of  borrowers.  It  is  not  surprising  that  conventional  banks  are  reluctant  to  lend 
in  some  neighborhoods.  The  CRA  process  can  play  an  essential  role  in  breaking  down 
cultural  prejudices  by  allowing  bankers  to  interact  with  their  communities.  This  is  an  on- 
going  process  that  may  take  many  years  to  reap  substantial  benefits  (that  is,  to  increase  the 
supply  of  credit  to  underserved  areas  through  conventional  banking  practices).  To  facilitate 
the  transition,  nontraditional  alternatives  are  needed.  As  those  who  are  already  engaged  in 
community  development  banking  frequently  argue,  it  is  easier  to  make  a banker  out  of  a 
community  activist  than  it  is  to  make  a community  activist  out  of  a banker.  We  would  not 
want  to  go  too  far  with  this  line  of  thought:  however,  there  is  something  to  the  claim  that 
conventional  banks  may  never  become  good  “community  banks.”  Hence,  we  propose  an 
alternative  system  of  CDBs  that  will  be  designed  from  the  ground-up  to  provide  a limited 
range  of  services  to  specific  communities  that  are  not  now  well-served. 
Geographic  and  functional  specialization  will  allow  the  CDBs  to  face  lower  costs  in  certain 
well-defined  markets,  or  “niches”.  As  the  CDBs  establish  a customer  base  in  the  targeted 
community,  they  will  be  able  to  make  the  “small  deals”  that  would  not  be  sufficiently 
profitable  for  traditional  financial  institutions.  In  some  cases,  the  success  of  the  CDBs  will 
encourage  the  traditional  lenders  to  move  into  these  communities;  we  would  view  this  as  a 
success. 
The  establishment  of  a  system  of  CDBs  could  increase  the  availability  of  credit  to  credit- 
worthy  households  that  cannot  meet  the  underwriting  standards  required  for  secondary 
21 mortgage  markets.  It would  also  increase  the number  of institutions  whose  natural  habitat  is 
the  small  loan,  targeted  to communities  not  currently  receiving  an adequate  supply  of  small 
commercial  business  loans.  By keeping  the CDBs  small,  we can  ensure  that  their  focus  will 
be the  “small  deal”.  Moreover,  by restricting  the  CDBs  geographically  and functionally, 
can ensure  that  their  focus  will  remain  in  their  “niche”--areas  underserved  by  traditional 
financial  institutions. 
we 
Furthermore,  geographic  and functional  restrictions  will  allow  the  CDBs  to provide  an 
important  supplement  to any  “enterprise  zone” programs.  President  Clinton  has called  for 
legislation  to promote  investment  and job  creation  in Federally-designated  zones.  His proposal 
includes  job  tax credits,  investment  incentives,  and employer  wage  credits.  Estimated  outlays 
may  reach  $2.4 billion  over  four  years.  One  option  would  be to appropriate  some  of these 
funds  for  the establishment  of  a system  of  CDBs. This  would  potentially  allow  for  much 
greater  investment  than  $2.4 billion  in  the enterprise  zones,  because  the  CDBs  would  leverage 
the  government’s  equity  investment.  [For example,  given  an investment  of  $500  million  in 
equity  in  CDBs,  and  given  an equity-to-asset  ratio  of  8% for  the  CDBs,  the government’s 
investment  in  the  enterprise  zones  would  be expanded  to a maximum  of  more  than  $6 
billion]. 
IV. Transactions,  Payments,  and  Savings  Services 
Traditional  financial  institutions,  for  a variety  of reasons,  are less  able  and  willing  to provide 
22 transactions,  payments,  and  savings  services  for  low-income,  low-wealth  households.  First, 
increased  competition  from  “nonbank  banks,”  such  as  money  market  mutual  funds,  tended  to 
raise  the  interest  rate  that  had  to  be  paid  to  attract  deposits.  As  the  costs  of  attracting  deposits 
rose,  banks  and  thrifts  turned  to  increased  fees  in  an  attempt  to  cover  these  costs.  For 
example,  the  fees  on  non-interest  bearing  checking  accounts  rose  from  approximately  $27-$35 
in  1977  (at  1991  prices)  to  $60-$66  by  1991  (this  discussion  follows  Caskey  1993,  from 
which  all  data  were  obtained).  Banks  have  also  raised  minimum  balance  requirements.  One 
savings  bank  even  instituted  a one-dollar-per-month  fee  on  savings  accounts  with  balances 
less  than  $100.  It  found  that  it  lost  24%  of  its  accounts,  but  this  amounted  to  only  1.6%  of  its 
deposits  since  the  lost  accounts  were  quite  small.  However,  this  is  indicative  of  recent  trends: 
rising  fees  and  higher  minimum  balances  have  forced  a  segment  of  the  population  out  of  the 
traditional  banking  system.  Many  of  those  who  have  left  the  banking  system  have  turned  to 
“fringe  banking”--primarily  pawnshops  and  neighborhood  check  cashing  outlets. 
Currently,  about  41%  of  households  with  income  below  $12,000  have  no  deposit  account  (up 
from  9.5%  in  1977),  and  31%  of  those  with  income  below  $18,000  have  no  deposit  account. 
Because  only  5%  of  households  without  deposit  accounts  have  bank  credit  cards,  the  vast 
majority  of  these  low  income  households  without  deposit  accounts  would  not  have  credit 
cards.  In  contrast,  63%  of  those  with  deposit  accounts  do  have  credit  cards.  Thus,  it  is 
common  for  low-income  households  to  rely  on  pawnshops  for  credit  and  on  check  cashing 
facilities  for  payment  and  transactions  services. 
23 The  typical  user of  a pawnshop  earns  $8,000-$16,000  per  year,  lives  paycheck-to-paycheck, 
does  not  have  a checking  account  or credit  card,  and borrows  less than  $50 at an interest  rate 
that  commonly  reaches  240%  per year.  As many  as 80% of the users of  pawnshops  are repeat 
customers.  Most  users of check  cashing  facilities  are low-to-middle  income  workers  or 
recipients  of  government  transfers,  and  they  tend  to be young  and nonwhite.  Regular  users 
typically  do not  have  a bank  account.  In  a study  of three  New Jersey  counties,  it was found 
that  almost  half  of all  AFDC  checks  issued  in the counties  .were cashed  at check  cashing 
facilities;  of the  users  interviewed  as they  left  the facility  after  cashing  an AFDC  check,  it 
was found  that  92%  did  not  have  a bank  account.  Because  banks  and thrifts  will  not  typically 
cash  checks  of  noncustomers,  low-income  households  without  bank  accounts  rely,  to a great 
extent,  on check  cashing  facilities.  [A national  survey,  which  included  primarily  urban  areas 
in fifteen  states plus  the District  of  Columbia,  found  that  71% of  urban  banks  and  thrifts 
would  not  even  cash  a government  check  for  a nondepositor  at any  price;  only  14% would  do 
it without  charge,  and the remainder  would  do it for  a fee]. 
These  facilities  earn  fee income  from  cashing  checks  and from  issuing  money  orders  used by 
customers  to pay  bills.  The  fee for  cashing  a government  or payroll  check  averages  1.5%-3% 
in those  states  in  which  fees  are not regulated  (actual  fees  will  fall  outside  the  averages);  the 
fee  is 4%-U%  for personal  checks.  Facilities  typically  charge  more  for cashing  a welfare 
check  than  for cashing  a social  security  check.  Some  check  cashing  facilities  charge  as much 
as 56%  for  cashing  government  checks:  even  in  states  that regulate  the  maximum  allowable 
fees,  the  facilities  frequently  charge  more  than  the  legal  limit  (for  example,  in  a New  York 
24 study,  it  was  found  that  49%  of  the  users  of  facilities  paid  more  than  the  legal  maximum,  and 
the  average  overcharge  was  44%). 
A  family  with  an  annual  income  of  $10,000  would  spend  about  $185  per  year  if  it  relied  on  a 
check  cashing  facility  for  its  transactions  and  payment  services:  the  same  family,  with  a 
minimal  balance  in  a checking  account  at  a bank,  would  pay  about  $60  per  year  if  it  wrote 
six  checks  per  month.  Those  that  rely  on  the  more  costly  check  cashing  facilities  do  so  for  a 
variety  of  reasons:  they  have  no  bank  account;  they  need  the  cash  immediately  and  cannot 
wait  for  the  check  to  clear;  they  are  afraid  the  check  would  bounce  (entailing  large  fees),  or 
because  the  check  cashing  is  more  convenient  (e.g.,  location,  hours,  etc.). 
A  well-designed  CDB  system  could  provide  an  efficient  and  equitable  alternative  to  expensive 
fringe-banking.  At  the  same  time,  it  could  bring  many  of  those  now  excluded  into  the 
payments  system  that  most  Americans  use.  Finally,  it  could  offer  a safe  and  secure  repository 
for  savings,  encouraging  thrift  in  low  income  communities  that  currently  do  not  have 
adequate  access  to  traditional  banks. 
V. Community  development  banks 
We  believe  that  the  establishment  of  a nationwide  system  of  CDBs,  as  proposed  by  President 
Clinton,  provides  the  means  to  most  effectively  address  the  issue  of  inadequate  access  to 
credit.  The  creation  of  banks  in  communities  where  lending  is  severely  curtailed,  if  available 
25 at all,  will  enhance  the  welfare  of low-income  citizens,  inner-city  minorities,  and 
entrepreneurs  seeking  small  scale  financing  for  their  businesses.  Our proposal  for  this  type  of 
community  bank  draws  from  the pilot  programs  of community  lending  in  Illinois  and 
Arkansas,  where  the  success  of the community  development  bank  concept  has  been 
demonstrated  by  the experience  of  the  Shorebank  Corporation  of Chicago  and  the  Southern 
Development  Bancorporation  in  Arkansas.  We  will  briefly  outline  the  structure  of our 
proposed  CDB  system. 
The  basic  functions  of these  CDBs  include:  (a) the payment  system  for  check  cashing  and 
clearing,  and credit  and debit  cards,  (b) the  secure  depositories  for  savings  and  transaction 
balances,  (c) mortgage  financing  for  households  and home  rehabilitation/improvement  loans, 
and  (d) commercial  banking  services  for  loans,  payroll  services,  and  advice.  To  be sure,  there 
also  exist  functions  of investment  banking  and  asset management,  but these  are less important 
for  the  segments  of  the population  that  these  CDBs  will  serve.  Some  services,  such  as check 
cashing  and  short-term  loans  are being  carried  out  by  (often  unregulated)  financial 
establishments  of  fringe  banking  as mentioned  earlier  (e.g., check  cashing  facilities  and. 
pawnshops)--at  present,  there  are about  9,000 pawnshops  and  5,000  check  cashing  facilities  in 
the  U.S.,  according  to Caskey.  The  primary  goals  of these  CDBs,  then,  will  be to:  (i) deliver 
credit,  payment,  and  savings  opportunities,  and  (ii) provide  finance  for  households  and  small 
business  throughout  a designated  area  not  adequately  served  by  traditional  banks,  the  CRA 
requirements  notwithstanding. 
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the  savings  facility.  These  require  none  of  the “underwriting  and judgment”  skills  of  the 
banker  who  takes  risks.  Under  our proposal,  each  CDB would  offer  deposit  and  savings 
accounts,  check  cashing  services  for depositors,  automatic  deposit  of payroll  and  government 
checks,  automatic  payment  (with  customer  authorization)  of certain  monthly  bills,  and credit 
cards  (with  a small  line  of credit  determined  by the customer’s  deposit  and credit  history). 
This  will  enable  customers  to achieve  substantial  savings  over  the costs  of transactions  at 
check  cashing  facilities  (or traditional  banks)  and over  the costs  of  short-term  credit  provided 
by pawnshops:  it will  encourage  thrift  and responsible  financial  behavior  of customers,  and 
will  provide  a source  of  funds  to be “reinvested”  in the community  by the  CDB  through  its 
loan-making  activity. 
An  assumption  underlying  the  lack  of credit  facilities  assertion  is that  there  are “bankable 
risks”  and  feasible  “equity  investments”  in distressed  communities  that  involve  dollar  amounts 
too  small  for  the  established  banking  community.  Even  “small” commercial  banks  customarily 
handle  asset  and liability  denominations  that are larger  than  those  typically  generated  in low- 
income  communities. 
Projects  that  promise  to be profitable  but are not  being  financed  because  of  their  small  size, 
their  perceived  riskiness,  or the “inexperience”  of the prospective  management,  under  our 
proposal,  would  become  the  aim of  the  CDBs. Theory  and evidence  suggest  that  commercial 
banks  exercise  a high  degree  of discretion  when  approving  a loan,  be it for  home  or  business, 
27 since  no  application  perfectly  meets  a guideline  for  obligation  or  loan/value  ratio.  Thus,  loans 
to  homebuyers  or  firms  are  not  approved  unless  strong  credit  histories  or  established  close 
relations  with  a loan  officer  exist.  This  means  that  individuals  and  firms  that  have  been 
denied  access  to  credit  find  it  difficult  to  establish  the  required  ties;  in  the  case  of  firms,  this 
problem  is  aggravated  when  they  are  small  and,  hence,  lack  market  power. 
The  objective  of  each  CDB  is  to  be  profitable,  and  it  will  be  as  successful  as  the  projects  it 
finances  are  profitable:  this  will  dictate  close  supervision  of  its  customers.  Government  seed 
money  may  be  involved,  but  the  government’s  investment  in  the  CDB  system  should  be 
viewed  as  a profit-making  investment. 
Since  the  proposal  we  envision  for  a nationwide  system  of  community  development  banks  has 
been  outlined  in  considerable  detail  in  a previous  publication  (Minsky,  et.  al.,  1993),  we  have 
only  described  here  the  main  features  that  distinguish  it  from  existing  and  other  models  of 
CDBs. 
The  existing  models  of  CDBs  provide  a useful  starting  point  for  the  development  of  a 
nationwide  strategy.  However,  we  believe  that  there  are  significant  problems  with  existing 
CDBs  and  other  proposals  that  have  been  advanced  based  on  these.  Our  own  evaluation, 
which  has  been  detailed  elsewhere  (Minsky,  etal,  1993),  convinces  us  that  the  existing 
models  should  not  serve  as  prototypes  for  a nationwide  system  of  CDBs.  These  problems 
aside,  the  community  development  banks  have  been  successful,  nevertheless,  especially  in 
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improved. 
In  addition,  the  existing  CDBs  have  become  the  impetus  for  other  banks  to  enter  the  business 
of  home  rehabilitation  lending:  these  banks  have  been  responding  to  the  demand  from 
consumers,  and  to  the  successful  and  profitable  portfolio  of  such  loans  at  the  Shorebank.  This 
is  an  example  of  the  market  working  to  the  benefit  of  both  business  and  consumer.  We  expect 
that  in  a nationwide  system,  existing  banks  (under  pressure  of  competition)  will  respond  and 
provide  competition  for  the  CDBs  especially  when  default  rates  on  such  loans  are  lower,  as 
the  experience,  thus  far,  shows. 
Our  proposal  deviates  from  other  community  development  bank  proposals  in  four  key  ways. 
First,  most  other  proposals  are  based  on  the  example  provided  by  one  of  the  existing 
community  development  banks  (such  as  Shorebank  of  Chicago).  These  typically  rely  on  funds 
gathered  from  outside  the  community,  from  institutions  and  individuals  who  share  the  goals 
of  community  development  banking,  and  who  are  willing  to  receive  below  market  interest 
rates.  However,  a nationwide  system  cannot  rely  on  “socially-conscious”  funding. 
Furthermore,  the  assets  of  some  of  the  existing  institutions  are  comprised  primarily  of  home 
mortgage  loans.  In  contrast,  our  proposal  emphasizes  a wider  range  of  assets,  which  is  the  key 
to  revitalizing  communities. 
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(FBCDB),  which  would  be  responsible  for  the  funding,  regulation,  and  supervision  of  the 
CDBs.  It  would  act  as  the  central  bank,  the  correspondent  bank,  the  link  with  financial 
markets,  the  supervising  authority,  and  it  may  provide  some  clearing  services.  It  would  be 
responsible  for  training  and  for  the  testing  of  competency  of  CDB  officers  and  staff.  The 
FBCDB  would  be  started  with  an  initial  investment  of  $1  billion  by  the  Congress,  which 
could  be  augmented  to  $5  billion  as  growth  of  the  system  warrants.  It  is  designed  to  operate 
at  a profit  once  the  start-up  period  is  over. 
Third,  our  proposal  is  not  a  substitute  for  the  current  Community  Reinvestment  Act,  and  we 
do  not  believe  that  ownership  of  a CDB  should  rest  with  existing  institutions  in  the 
commercial  banking  sector.  Partial  government  ownership  of  the  CDBs  gives  the  government 
an  effective  method  of  supervision  and  control  over  each  CDB.  This  will  help  to  ensure  the 
safety  and  soundness  of  the  institutions,  as  well  as  ensuring  that  the  focus  of  the  CDBs 
remains  the  targeted  functions  and  communities. 
Fourth,  our  proposal  deviates  from  others  by  setting-up  a nationwide  system  of  independent, 
for-profit  institutions.  The  FBCDB  would  match  up  to  $5  million  of  private  investment  in 
each  CDB  (so  that  as  many  as  200  CDBs  could  be  capitalized  by  the  initial  one  billion  dollar 
government  investment  in  the  FBCDB).  As  a major  investor,  it  would  have  representation  on 
each  board,  and  as  a co-investor,  it  would  automatically  have  the  right  to  inspect  the  books  of 
all  CDBs.  Each  CDB  would  have  to  obtain  at  least  $1  million  in  private  equity  investments, 
30 up to a maximum  of  $5 million  of private  equity  (matched  by another  $5 million  from  the 
FBCDB).  Each  would  then  operate  without  government  subsidies. 
V. Conclusion 
The  CDBs  should  not be seen  as a substitute  for the  CRA or for other  programs  designed  to 
revitalize  lower  income  areas.  Rather,  they  should  be seen  as a complement  for  existing 
programs  and  for  other  programs  that  will  be proposed  by  the  Clinton  administration.  As 
discussed  above,  the  CRA process  ensures  that  a dialogue  takes  place  among  regulators, 
financial  institutions,  and  served  communities:  it ensures  that  banks  identify  their  communities 
and  that  they  satisfy  some of  the needs  of  these communities.  Moreover,  it  helps  to expand 
the  awareness  of  bankers  such that  their  expectations  about  presently  underserved  areas  are 
revised.  It is unrealistic  to expect  that  any  financial  institution  can  meet  all  the  needs  of  any 
community;  thus,  there  is a role  for  a CDB to play  in  some  communities  that  supplements  the 
role  played  by  traditional  financial  institutions.  Similarly,  while  we believe  that  CDBs  have  an 
important  role  to play  in revitalizing  low income  communities,  we certainly  do not  see these 
as a substitute  for  the  wide  range  of programs  (both  public  and private)  that  will  be needed  to 
reverse  long  trends  of deterioration  experienced  by  some distressed  communities. 
Finally,  the  CDBs  are not  intended  to be welfare  programs  but to provide  services  to the 
community’s  residents,  and consequently,  they  must  meet  the  long-run  market  tests  of 
profitability.  Aside  from  the  service  aspect,  community  development  banks  will:  (i) improve 
31 the well-being  of our citizens  not  now  served  because  of  unresponsive,  yet  traditional  loan 
qualification  norms,  and  (ii) directly  increase  the opportunities  for potential  entrepreneurs  and 
potential  employees.  The  basic  assumption  underlying  the community  development  bank  is 
that  all  areas  of  the country  need  banks  that  are clearly  oriented  toward  the  small  customer: 
households  that  have  a small  net worth,  a small  IRA  account,  and  a small  transactions 
account,  and  businesses  that  need  financing  measured  in thousands  rather  than  millions  or 
billions  of dollars. 
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